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Abstract 
The question of what creates government quality, or good institutions, is one of the central puzzles in 
modern political science. This dissertation investigates a hitherto underexplored cause: taxation. 
Historical research on early modern Europe has demonstrated that the collection of government 
revenue, mainly in the form of domestic taxes, was a main driver of the construction of a strong and 
meritocratic bureaucracy, and increased popular calls for accountability and representation, both key 
components of good institutions and the concept of government quality. Although a burgeoning 
literature has begun drawing parallels between this historical tax-driven process and institution 
building in today’s world, there is still a dearth of systematic tests of the link. Through a series of 
empirical investigations, this dissertation seeks to fill this gap.  
The introductory chapter presents global-level cross-country evidence that countries that impose 
higher taxes are also better governed. Through statistical analysis it furthermore finds a causal element 
present – taxation causes government quality, especially over the long run.  
 The long-term nature inherent to this tax-driven process is further emphasized in paper I, which 
links present day government quality in former British colonies to the extent to which the colonial 
power collected revenue during the beginning of the 20th century.  
Paper II focuses on conditions further back in time, comparing religious financing in 
northwestern Europe during the early modern era and the Ottoman Empire. In the former setting, 
religious institutions were mainly financed and organized from below, leading to a strong tradition of 
local level accountability. In the latter such activities tended to be provided for, and accordingly 
controlled by, wealthy patrons. The study concludes that such variation in the way these essential 
public services were run can be tied to the subsequent divergence in level of democracy and openness 
in the Arab and western European countries. 
 Paper III investigates a crucial mechanism inherent to the taxation-government quality hypothesis, 
namely the idea that taxation activates citizens to take political action. By analyzing individuals’ 
taxpaying behavior in sub-Saharan Africa, the study finds that people who pay taxes are more 
politically interested than those who do not pay. 
 Finally, paper IV returns to the present day context. It poses the argument that the generally 
positive relationship between taxation and government quality in large part is driven by democratic 
states. Through analysis on global cross-country data, as well as data on individuals in sub-Saharan 
African, this hypothesis is supported.  
 In sum, the findings in this dissertation support the notion of placing taxation more centrally in the 
ongoing discussion of how government quality and good institutions are created. 
 
